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Abstract 
 
Four studies provide support for the development and validation of a framework for 
understanding the range of social psychological outcomes valued subjectively as 
consequences of negotiations.  Study 1 inductively elicited and coded elements of 
subjective value among students, community members, and negotiation practitioners, 
revealing 20 categories that negotiation theorists in Study 2 sorted to reveal four 
underlying dimensions: Feelings about Instrumental Outcomes, the Self, Process, and 
Relationship.  Study 3 proposed a new Subjective Value Inventory (SVI) questionnaire 
and confirmed its 4-factor structure, and Study 4 presents convergent, discriminant, and 
predictive validity data for this SVI.  Results suggest the SVI is a promising tool to 
systematize and encourage research on the subjective outcomes of negotiation. 
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What do people value when they negotiate?  
Mapping the domain of subjective value in negotiation. 
Negotiation— a decision-making process in which people mutually decide how 
to allocate scarce resources  (Pruitt, 1983)—on its face, appears to involve primarily the 
exchange of tangible goods and services, yet it also leaves an inherently psychological 
imprint on those involved.   Whereas conventional wisdom and decades of research 
have tended to portray negotiation as an economically motivated or strategic 
interaction best practiced by rational, unemotional actors—perhaps as a result of the 
origins of the field in the study of choice and expected utility within economics 
(Bazerman, 1983; Nash, 1950)—more recent research has attempted to challenge this 
rationalist assumption and to incorporate subjective, social psychological factors into 
negotiations research (for reviews see, e.g., Bazerman, Curhan, & Moore, 2001; 
Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992; Thompson, 1990).  This paper presents the results of a large-
scale investigation designed to add to this newer body of research, by providing a 
comprehensive framework of subjective outcomes in negotiation.  The goal is both to 
contribute to the advancement of theory and to provide a tool for researchers to study 
subjective value in negotiations with a similar level of precision as that with which 
more tangible objective value has been studied for decades. 
Although objective behavioral outcomes clearly represent an important aspect of 
negotiation performance, researchers have criticized the relative lack of attention paid 
to social psychological measures in negotiation.  As early as 1975, Rubin and Brown 
argued that, “the time has come to move such measures…out of the dark recess known 
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as ‘supplementary analysis’ back into the forefront of researchers’ attention, where they 
belong” (p. 297).  Since the 1960s and 70s, there has been a gradual increase in the use of 
perceptual and attitudinal measures as dependent variables within studies of 
negotiation, but even in a review of the recent ten year period from 1993-2002, such 
measures were included in only 16% of studies (Mestdagh & Buelens, 2003).  Other 
studies have incorporated social psychological factors as the predictors of economic 
outcomes, rather than as consequential outcomes themselves (Bazerman, Curhan, 
Moore, & Valley, 2000; Kurtzberg & Medvec, 1999).  The current paper attempts to fill 
this gap with a series of studies mapping the domain of subjective value in negotiation, 
using a combination of methods to explore and categorize the range of psychological 
factors that people value as the consequences of their negotiations.  We also present the 
development and initial validation of a survey tool to measure subjective value.  The 
aim is to be as exhaustive as possible, not to supplant related areas of research but 
rather to organize and pull together topics that often have been studied in separation—
as diverse, for example, as procedural justice and self-efficacy—and to include them 
within a broad systematic framework of negotiation outcomes.  In doing so, we define 
the concept of subjective value as the social and emotional consequences of a negotiation.  
Social Psychological Outcomes in Negotiation 
 Previous conceptual frameworks of negotiation measures form a starting point 
for the current investigation of subjective value, which contributes in turn an empirical 
test and validation of these frameworks.  In her 1990 review of research in negotiation, 
Thompson proposed that negotiation measures fall into two broad classes: economic 
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and social psychological.  Economic outcomes refer to explicit terms or products of the 
negotiation, such as whether or not an agreement has been reached, how much value or 
joint benefit has been created, and how resources are divided or claimed by the 
individual parties (see also Nash, 1953).  Social psychological measures in negotiation, 
Thompson argued, are grounded in social perception and consist of three important 
elements: perceptions of the bargaining situation, perceptions of the other party, and 
perceptions of oneself.  Although Thompson’s framework includes measures of 
negotiation process in addition to outcome variables, we argue that negotiators’ feelings 
about process—rather than the process itself—are themselves important outcomes that 
help to comprise subjective value.  
 Thompson’s first category concerns perceptions of the bargaining situation.  This 
includes judgments and feelings about the negotiation process and its outcome, for 
example the norms, context, structure and scripts, communication and information 
sharing, and fairness or justice involved (e.g., Bazerman & Carroll, 1987; Brockner & 
Wiesenfeld, 1996; Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001; Cropanzano & 
Greenberg, 1997; Folger, 1977; Greenberg, 1987; Lim & Carnevale, 1990; Lind & Tyler, 
1988; Murnighan, Babcock, Thompson, & Pillutla, 1999; Pinkley, 1990; Thibaut & 
Walker, 1975; Thompson & Hastie, 1990; Van den Bos & Lind, 2001; Weingart, 
Thompson, Bazerman, & Carroll, 1990). In the latter case, it is worth making the 
distinction between subjective value and inherent goods such as justice and voice, in 
that many but not all negotiators subjectively value such factors—for example, one can 
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imagine a negotiator who feels pleased with an outcome that is admittedly an unfair 
benefit.  
 Perceptions of the other party, Thompson’s (1990) second category, involve the 
results of more general processes of person perception and impression formation 
applied to one’s negotiation counterpart.  Such processes result in feelings that can be 
classified as either individual or dyadic—that is, what negotiators think of their 
counterparts, and what they think of their own relationships with those counterparts, 
respectively—although in practice the two are dynamically linked and can be difficult 
to separate.  This factor includes the attributions that negotiators make about 
counterparts based on their behavior—e.g., their ethics, tactics, and strategies, and more 
general trait inferences such as expertise, cooperativeness, and friendliness—and a 
negotiator’s resulting reputation and social capital (e.g., Brandstatter, Kette, & Sageder, 
1982; Fortgang, Lax, & Sebenius, 2003; Goates, Barry, & Friedman, 2004; Morris, Larrick, 
& Su, 1999; Robinson, Lewicki, & Donahue, 2000; Tinsley, O’Connor, & Sullivan, 2002).  
At the dyadic level, this factor includes the social relationship, trust, respect, liking, and 
concern for the other party that develops among negotiation counterparts (e.g., 
Kurtzberg & Medvec, 1999; Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 1998; Lewicki & Stevenson, 
1997; McAllister, 1995; Naquin & Paulson, 2003; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986). 
 Thompson’s third category, perceptions of the self, involves turning the person 
perception process inward.  Negotiators judge their own traits, performance, and 
worth, using both their internal awareness of their motivations and values, as well as 
their observations of their own behavior as if from the outside (Ross, 1977).  Unique to 
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perceptions of the self are the concerns of self-efficacy, self-enhancement and positive 
illusions, self-esteem and maintaining “face” (e.g., Bandura, 1977; Bazerman et al., 2001; 
Brown, 1968; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004; Stajkovic & 
Luthans, 1998; Taylor & Brown, 1994; White, Tynan, Galinsky, & Thompson, 2004).  
White and colleagues (2004) argued that negotiation can be an especially face 
threatening experience because it often involves confrontation and assigning public 
tangible worth to objects and efforts of personal value.  Thus, feeling comfortable with 
one’s performance and behavior in a negotiation can be a particularly important 
outcome to many negotiators. 
 We expand on Thompson’s (1990) framework by highlighting separately an area 
included within the first category, perceptions of the bargaining situation: a negotiator’s 
feelings about the final terms of the settlement.  At the nexus of objective and subjective 
value is the subjective feeling of satisfaction with one’s objective outcome.  Oliver, 
Balakrishnan & Barry (1994) argued that such outcome satisfaction is an affective 
comparative evaluation of a given settlement, with important implications for 
subsequent behavior such as willingness to continue the relationship with one’s 
counterpart.  A negotiator perceives a settlement to be advantageous or 
disadvantageous via social comparison with respect to the outcomes achieved by other 
negotiators as well as by comparing it with prior expectations (e.g., Bazerman, 
Loewenstein, & White, 1992; Loewenstein, Thompson, & Bazerman, 1989; McClelland & 
Rohrbaugh, 1978; Messick & Sentis, 1985; Novemsky & Schweitzer, 2004; Oliver et al., 
1994; Straub & Murnighan, 1995).  At some level, subjective feelings of success are often 
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the only feedback a negotiator has for his or her performance, given that outside of a 
classroom exercise one might know the exact dollar value of a deal but rarely the dollar 
value of the best possible deal that the other side would have accepted or, indeed, the 
dollar value of deals that would have been achieved by peers in an identical situation.   
The Value of Subjective Value 
 Social psychological outcomes of negotiation are not necessarily the consolation 
prize of a poor bargaining agreement, but rather represent an important area of study 
for at least three reasons.  Subjective value can serve as a good in itself, as a negotiator’s 
intuition about objective outcomes, and as a predictor of future objective value. 
 A good in itself.   In O. Henry’s classic Christmas story, The Gift of the Magi, a 
young husband and wife facing hard times each sell their most prized possession in 
order to buy a gift that is rendered useless by the other’s parallel sacrifice.  Likewise, in 
the real world, negotiators often choose to forfeit or limit opportunities to extract 
economic value, either consciously or unconsciously, in the pursuit of relational goals 
and norms, and in fact doing so might preserve or even strengthen relationships, and 
contribute to individual affect and well-being (Curhan, Neale, Ross, & Rosencranz-
Engelmann, 2004).    Negotiations often take place in the context of ongoing 
interpersonal relationships—among family members, friends, neighbors, colleagues, 
and long-time business associates—and the quality of the relationship can be itself 
important beyond the particular issues at stake and resources being divided (Gelfand, 
Smith, Raver, & Nishii, in press).  Even in the absence of a relationship, or knowledge of 
a counterpart’s identity, participants in ultimatum bargaining games often make 
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financial trade-offs in order to preserve their own subjective feelings about fairness to 
others (see, e.g., Bazerman & Neale, 1992; Camerer & Thaler, 1995; Guth, Schmittberger, 
& Schwarze, 1982).  “Negotiators’ interests can go beyond the obvious and tangible,” 
Lax and Sebenius (1986) wrote, “Take for example, the almost universal quest for social 
approval or the simple pleasure one derives from being treated with respect, even in a 
one-time encounter” (p. 74). 
Negotiator’s intuition about objective outcomes. Parties often lack the information 
and ability to perform a full, accurate, rational analysis of negotiation situations, and 
consequently can have perceptions that differ greatly from objective economic analyses 
(Thompson, 1990; Thompson & Hastie, 1990).  How do you ever know if you succeeded 
in a negotiation?  It would be implausible, not to mention uncomfortable, for a real-
world negotiation to conclude with a full debrief allowing parties to ascertain others’ 
aspirations, targets, and breaking points.  In many cases, it would be challenging even 
to quantify one’s own outcomes and to aggregate across multiple issues that are often 
variable and perceptual.  Thus, negotiators generally rely on their subjective intuition to 
determine how well they did.  If subjective value mirrors a negotiator’s intuitions about 
performance, then, it may serve as a more proximal predictor of future behavior than 
objective performance itself.  It is a person’s perceptions, thoughts, and attitudes—
rather than the objective reality of a situation—that influence behavior, even if the link 
is not always direct or transparent (see, e.g., Eagley & Chaiken, 1998).  This implies that 
understanding subjective value could shed light on the motivations and action 
tendencies of a negotiator, as well as the process of learning from experience. 
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Predictor of future objective value.  Finally, the subjective value resulting from a 
negotiation may feed back, positively or negatively, into future economic outcomes.  
Individuals who increase the subjective value of their counterparts may be able to 
develop and reap the benefits of more favorable reputations (Fortgang, Lax, & Sebenius, 
2003; Goates et al., 2004; Croson & Glick, 2001). Increasing one’s own subjective value 
could increase the perseverance and motivation to work towards effective settlements 
in future negotiation settings.  At the relationship level, the interpersonal rapport 
developed in Negotiation A might foster both concern for the other party as well as 
information sharing and other negotiation behaviors critical to the success of 
Negotiation B (Drolet & Morris, 2000; Mannix, Tinsley, & Bazerman, 1995; Pruitt & 
Rubin, 1986).  Indeed, the relationship is more likely to remain intact and Negotiation B 
even to take place if negotiators establish firm foundation for a relationship in 
Negotiation A (Oliver et al., 1994).  Further, negotiators need sufficient good will to 
implement both the objective terms of a contract as well as the so-called social contract 
addressing how they work together, communicate, and resolve disputes in the future 
(Fortgang, Lax, & Sebenius, 2003; Walton, Cutcher-Gershenfeld, & McKersie, 1994).  
Thus, maintaining good relationships, which can be hindered by extracting all possible 
economic rewards, can be an effective strategy in maintaining the cooperation necessary 
for greater returns in the long run.  For example, in the prisoner’s dilemma game, the 
tit-for-tat strategy prevails over other strategies in the long term—even though it does 
not outperform any given counterpart—because it maintains stable cooperation over 
longer periods than other strategies (e.g., Axelrod, 1984; Komorita & Parks, 1995). 
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 Although subjective value may be a precursor to future objective value, it is 
important to emphasize that the two frequently diverge as well—particularly, but not 
exclusively, in the short term.  The subjective satisfaction that one derives from an 
objective outcome is not a linear function of that outcome, nor even in some cases 
necessarily a monotonically increasing function (Conlon, Lind, & Lissak, 1989; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Northcraft, Brodt, & Neale, 1995). Indeed, experimental 
manipulations such as increasing or attending to one’s aspirations can drive the two in 
opposite directions, increasing objective negotiation performance while simultaneously 
reducing subjective satisfaction (Galinsky, Mussweiler, & Medvec, 2002; Thompson, 
1995).  Thus, it is worth studying subjective, psychological value as a distinct factor in 
spite of the reciprocal relationship it can have with objective, economic value. 
The Value of Measuring Subjective Value  
Even if the umbrella term of subjective value may be new, the concept itself is 
already woven into the fabric of negotiations research.  The contribution of the current 
investigation is to develop a comprehensive framework and to validate a survey 
measure of subjective value.  Negotiation theorists have not yet agreed upon the 
methods and standards for measuring subjective outcomes (Kurtzberg & Medvec, 1999; 
Valley, Neale, & Mannix, 1995).  Thompson (1990) argued that “comparative analyses of 
behavior are more difficult when investigators use different measures of performance.  
Apparently inconclusive results and even contradictory findings may often be traced to 
different measures of performance” (p. 517). Thus, this research program has the 
potential to benefit the field by making findings from different lines of research easier 
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and more meaningful to reconcile.  Further, creating a comprehensive, inductive 
framework has the potential to uncover possible blind spots within negotiations 
research, revealing fertile areas for future work and contributing towards the 
generation of theory about the role of subjective value in negotiation. 
 This paper presents the results of a four-study program of research designed to 
answer the question: What do people value when they negotiate?  The research used a 
combination of inductive and deductive methods, and engaged participants from 
conventional student populations as well as community members and negotiation 
practitioners.  We begin by attempting to map the domain of subjective value using an 
open-ended inductive approach to generate a wide range of elements of value based on 
participants’ past business and personal negotiations.  We continue in the second study 
by asking experts to delineate connections among these resulting elements of subjective 
value, revealing an underlying cognitive map of the construct into four broad factors.  
Just as Pinkley (1990) used an inductive method to examine the dimensions and 
schemas by which individuals conceptualize their conflicts, we aimed to conduct a 
similar analysis of the subjectively valued outcomes of such conflicts.  The third study 
uses these elements and broad factors as a starting point for the development of a 
survey instrument designed to assess subjective value across a range of negotiation 
contexts.  Finally, the fourth study presents initial evidence for the validity of this 
survey instrument, by showing its strong convergence with related constructs in the 
negotiations literature and lesser correlation with unrelated constructs, its divergence 
from personality traits, and its ability to predict negotiators’ actual willingness to 
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engage in future relationships with their counterparts.  The goal of these latter studies is 
to provide researchers with a systematic tool in order to include subjective value 
alongside objective value as a key consequence of negotiations. 
 
Study 1: What do people value? 
 We begin the program of research with a broad-based empirical exploration of 
subjective value.   Although existing theoretical frameworks and constructs within the 
umbrella of subjective value guide our understanding of the area, the goal of Study 1 is 
to provide as exhaustive and inclusive as possible an answer to the question of what 
people value in negotiation.  Thus, rather than limiting participants to pre-conceived 
categories of subjective outcomes, the design of this study provides an open-ended 
opportunity for a wide range of participants to generate examples of their own valued 
outcomes, in both recent business and personal negotiation contexts. 
 This inductive approach is worthwhile for furthering our understanding of the 
types of priorities and hopes negotiators report for their interactions.  Although the self-
reported and retrospective nature of obtaining participants’ values can leave open the 
question of whether participants may have additional values they are unable to access 
through introspection (e.g., Robinson & Clore, 2002; Silvia & Gendolla, 2001) or 
unwilling to report due to concerns of social desirability and self-presentation (e.g., 
DeMaio, 1984; Jones & Pittman, 1982; Schwarz & Strack, 1999), indeed the values that 
negotiators report for their interactions are deserving of research attention in 
themselves, even in cases where they may not be identical to the values actually held.  
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Given arguments that social desirability concerns are the least pronounced for 
participants completing self-administered confidential questionnaires, rather than face-
to-face or telephone interviews (DeMaio, 1984), that is the method used in Study 1.  
Further, to reduce but not eliminate concerns that participants may underreport certain 
types of values, the coding system included a separate category for any concept 
mentioned even by one participant.  In the absence of research that can effectively 
sample real-time a variety of disputes, the self-report questionnaire technique used in 
the current study remains a worthwhile tool for accessing the lay theories negotiators 
hold regarding their valued negotiation outcomes.   
Method 
Participants 
 In order to sample participants likely to represent a diversity of approaches and 
experiences with various negotiation contexts, a total of 103 students, community 
members, and negotiation practitioners were recruited to take part in the study.  Forty-
three undergraduate students at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology responded 
to campus flyers (Age M=19.23, SD=0.77; Female n=18, Male n=25; Ethnicity identified 
as African American n=11, Asian American n=10, Hispanic n=10, Caucasian n=9, and 
n=3 did not specify).  Thirty-two community members responded to posted 
advertisements in major transportation stations, squares, supermarkets and stores in the 
Boston area (Age M=33.45, SD=3.26; Female n=12, Male n=20; Ethnicity identified as 
Caucasian n=13, African American n=11, Hispanic n=4, Asian American n=1, and n=3 
did not specify).  Twenty-eight union and management negotiation practitioners 
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attending a negotiation workshop agreed to participate (Age M=49.96, SD=7.97; Female 
n=6, Male n=22; Ethnicity identified as Caucasian n=22, Asian American n=2, African 
American n=1, Hispanic n=1, and n=2 did not specify).  Students and community 
members were paid $10 for their participation.  
Procedure 
 Questionnaire.  Each participant completed a questionnaire designed to generate 
specific examples of the criteria they used to evaluate their subjective value from 
negotiations.  In order to evoke a wide range of possible contexts, the survey began 
with a definition of negotiation as “any situation in which people are trying to 
accomplish a goal and have to communicate with at least one other person in order to 
achieve that goal.”  Participants were instructed to recall two such incidences in which 
they had taken part during the last year, one in a personal setting and one in a business 
setting, and to describe each briefly in writing.  The order of instructions for describing 
the business versus personal setting was counterbalanced across participants.  
Following the request for a brief description of the negotiation, the survey instructed 
participants to generate subjective value factors: “Please list below what was important to 
you in the negotiation you just described.  In other words, what are all the factors that 
mattered to you in this negotiation.” To encourage a thorough listing of possible factors, 
these instructions appeared alongside 16 blank spaces, and invited participants to 
continue on the backside of the page if desired.  Participants completed an average of 
4.43 (SD=2.00) subjective value factors for personal and 4.42 (SD=2.16) for business 
negotiations.  Finally, following the generation of criteria, participants were instructed 
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to rate the importance to them personally of each factor they had just listed, using a scale 
of 1 (not very important) to 7 (extremely important). 
Coding.  Sixteen pilot surveys completed by students, professionals, and 
community members, not included in analyses below, provided sample subjective 
value factors used to create a coding system for examining the responses generated by 
the questionnaire.  Four independent coders used this initial coding system to 
categorize each subjective value factor appearing in a random sample of 22 of the 103 
questionnaires.  This process served to refine the coding system, which the four coders 
used for the remaining questionnaires.   
Results 
Table 1 lists the 20 coding categories that emerged, along with their frequency 
among the subjective value factors, their average rated importance, and the coding 
reliability.  Interestingly, although participants more frequently mentioned factors 
associated with their objective negotiation outcomes—that is, terms of the agreement 
that were either quantifiable (e.g., money or delivery time) or not readily quantifiable 
(e.g., high quality)—than any of the other factors, they did not rate such outcomes as 
more important than other factors.   This was the case both for business negotiations 
(objective outcomes M=5.38, SD=1.32, all other subjective value factors M=5.31, 
SD=1.59, t (47)=.91, ns, based on the n=48 participants reporting both types of factors for 
business negotiations) and personal negotiations (objective outcomes M=5.37, SD=1.60, 
all other subjective value factors M=5.38, SD=1.32, t (45)=.12, ns, based on the n=46 
participants reporting both types of factors for personal negotiations). In fact, even in 
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business negotiations, participants appeared to rate certain non-instrumental factors 
such as morality, relationship quality, and listening as more important on average than 
objective outcomes.  
Exploratory analyses without prior hypotheses examined whether any 
differences emerged in the frequencies and importance ratings of subjective value 
factors across the various demographic categories represented in the participant 
sample.   Female participants mentioned morality more often (10.8% versus 3.8%, 
χ2(1)=3.90, p<.05) and legitimacy less often (13.5% versus 25.2%, χ2 (1)=3.89, p<.05) than 
did males.  Among those participants listing such outcomes, female participants rated 
third party concern, and listening as more important than did male participants, 
t(32)=2.24, p=.03 and t(11)= 2.60, p=.02, respectively.  Examining ethnic group 
membership, groups differed in their frequency of mentioning morality (χ2 (3)=12.89, 
p=.005), with participants of African American background listing moral concerns in 
17.4% of their entries, Latin Americans in 9.4%, European Americans in 2.4%, and Asian 
Americans in 0.0%.  Among those participants listing subjective outcomes associated 
with effective process, ethnic groups differed in their ratings of the importance of these 
outcomes, F(3, 22)=3.91, p= .03, with Latin American participants listing the highest 
ratings, t(21)=2.63, p=.02. 
The student, community, and negotiation practitioner samples differed in their 
frequency of listing issues relating to the quantifiable terms of the agreement (χ2 (2)=6.83, 
p=.03; students 57.0% of entries, practitioners 43.6%, and community 35.9%), legitimacy 
(χ2 (2)=10.94, p=.004; practitioners 32.7% of entries, community 25.0%, and students 
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10.5%), and trust (χ2 (2)=11.29, p=.004; practitioners 16.4% of entries, students 4.7%, and 
community 1.6%).  Among those participants listing such outcomes, the occupational 
groups differed in their importance ratings of impact on an outside party, F(2, 33)=3.97, 
p=.03, with students considering such concerns more important, t(32)=2.28, p=.03, and 
practitioners considering them less important, t(32)=2.40, p=.02, and in their ratings of 
inclusive process, F(2, 15)=3.92, p=.05, with students considering such concerns more 
important than did other groups, t(14)=2.86, p=.01.  
In terms of the context of the negotiation, when discussing personal negotiations, 
participants more often reported goals of satisfaction (12.7% versus 3.9%; χ2(1)=5.29, 
p=.02), positive emotion (19.6% versus 7.8%; χ2 (1)=6.09, p=.01), mutual/inclusive agreements 
(12.7% versus 2.9%; χ2 (1)=6.89, p=.009), and peaceful/non-confrontational process (3.9% 
versus 0.0%; χ2 (1)=4.12, p=.04), and less often impact on an outside party (10.8% versus 
22.3%, χ2 (1)=4.94, p=.03) than they did when discussing business negotiations.  Among 
those participants listing such outcomes in both cases, resolution was rated as more 
important in business than personal negotiations, t(12)=4.03, p=.002. 
Discussion 
Study 1 was an inductive examination of the components of subjective value.  
Participants provided an unconstrained reporting of the factors important to them in 
previous business and personal negotiations, and reported their level of importance.  
One strength of this empirical approach was the wide sampling of participants, and the 
broad definition of negotiation presented, likely to result in a range of approaches and 
experiences with various negotiation contexts.  Perhaps accordingly, it is noteworthy 
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that the issues addressed by the 20 resulting categories spanned from religious concerns 
to saving face to making more money.  Metrics of objective performance, the typical 
focus of much research on negotiations, were also the most salient to participants in 
terms of frequency of reporting.  Even so, fully half of the participants did not list any 
factors describing the objective terms of the agreement.  And, surprisingly, for 
participants reporting such objective metrics, they in fact rated them as no more 
important than many other factors highly personal and subjective.  These findings 
suggest that subjective outcomes in negotiation may be dramatically underrated in their 
real-world importance. 
 
Study 2: Mapping the domain 
The first study generated 20 different categories of subjective value, but left open 
the question of how these various categories relate to each other.  Thus, the goal of 
Study 2 is to examine the higher-order groupings and constructs that emerge when 
mapping out the domain of subjective value. 
In order to provide such a mapping, we engaged experienced negotiators in a 
sorting task designed to illustrate the emergent conceptual groupings among the 
factors.  Such sorting techniques are well established for studying a variety of cognitive 
and perceptual phenomena where the purpose is to provide measures of similarity 
versus distance between concepts or ideas (Rosenberg, 1982).  
Whereas Study 1 explored the negotiation outcomes valued by a wide range of 
participants, Study 2 relies on the expertise of negotiation theoreticians, members of a 
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distinguished research center.  Those who have themselves negotiated frequently or 
who have assisted multiple individuals with their negotiations may possess a more 
clearly articulated or nuanced conception of negotiation outcomes, drawing on this 
greater experience.  Indeed, Neale and Northcraft (1986) reported that practitioners 
generally held a more integrative and collaborative view of the process of negotiation, 
which suggests that they would likely hold a deep and comprehensive perspective on 
the topic of subjective value.  “Seen as the embodiment of the best subjective beliefs and 
laws of life that have been sifted and selected through the experience of succeeding 
generations,” Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2000) wrote, “Wisdom is defined as an 
expert knowledge system concerning the fundamental pragmatic issues of existence” 
(p. 11). Study 2 aimed to tap into this wisdom and sifting of subjective beliefs, in order 
to examine the constructs and cognitive mapping that may emerge within the larger 
umbrella of subjective value.  
Method 
Participants 
Participants were professional members of the Program on Negotiation (“PON”) 
at Harvard University, which describes itself as an “inter-university consortium 
committed to improving the theory and practice of negotiation and dispute resolution” 
(Source: http://www.pon.harvard.edu/).  The first author sent a letter of invitation for 
a one-hour interview to 116 PON members whose addresses appeared on the 
organization’s mailing list, of whom 24 (21%) agreed to participate.  The first 15 of these 
respondents were included in the study.  Their professions included university 
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professors, ombudspersons, mediation trainers, negotiation consultants, and other 
negotiation-related professional roles.  
Stimuli 
In order to serve as stimulus materials representing the various factors of 
subjective value that emerged in Study 1, a series of 40 index cards were prepared 
containing two exemplars each for the 20 coding categories.  The exemplars were first 
selected among samples of the coded items on the basis of being archetypes, in that the 
items represented frequent examples of the types of statements coded into that 
category.  The examples were then rephrased in order to apply generally to the widest 
range of negotiation settings, preserving participants’ own words where possible but 
eliminating the need to understand the specific context in which the statement was 
generated.  For example, in the relationship category, “if things ended, we’d still be 
friends” was rephrased as “parties’ relationship is not affected.”  In the listening 
category, “that my dad was listening to what I had to say” was rephrased as “party 
feels counterpart is listening.”  This process yielded 40 4-inch by 6-inch index cards, 
with one exemplar printed on each card.  Figure 1 lists the content of these exemplars. 
Procedure 
Participants were told that the set of 40 index cards, appearing in a random order 
differing for each participant, listed factors that participants in an earlier study had 
mentioned as important outcomes in their negotiations.  Instructions requested 
participants first to “sort the cards into conceptual categories that make sense to you, 
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based on the similarity or dissimilarity of the items, making as many or as few piles as 
you wish.” Participants created an average of 7.13 categories (sd=2.20).    
Results 
Analyses used the results of the sorting procedure in order to assess the 
conceptual distance between each pair of items among the collection of 40 (Rosenberg, 
1982), and subsequently the number of dimensions necessary and sufficient to describe 
the variations in subjective outcomes generated in Study 1.  In order to do this, a 40 x 40 
dissimilarity matrix generated for each participant contained a 0 for pairs of cards that 
were sorted into the same pile and a 1 for pairs sorted into different piles.  The 15 
participants’ distance matrices were summed together, so that each cell in the matrix 
contained a number between 0 and 15, representing the count of times that pair of cards 
appeared in different piles.  Such distance measures are the basis of input for the 
multivariate techniques of clustering and multidimensional scaling (Rosenberg, 1982).  
In order to provide converging evidence, and to be certain that the results are robust in 
elucidating the underlying structure by which experts grouped the subjective value 
factors, the analyses below employ both of these multivariate techniques. 
Cluster Analysis.  Cluster analysis is a classification technique for forming 
homogeneous groups using variance minimization techniques to provide the most 
coherence within groups and the greatest distance between groups (Blashfield, 1976; 
Borgen & Barnett, 1987; Kuiper & Fisher, 1975; Lorr, 1983).  Using the CLUSTER 
procedure in the SPSS statistical software package, a four-cluster solution emerged as 
the optimal grouping on the basis of the criteria outlined in Tunis, Fridhandler, & 
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Horowitz (1990) of (a) providing clusters that were conceptually meaningful and 
interpretable, and (b) stability, in that the content of the clusters changed only 
minimally when the four-cluster solution was compared with the other possible 
solutions.  Figure 1 presents the tree diagram or dendrogram, which illustrates the 
extent to which items clustered together into categories.  Based on the content of the 
individual items falling into each category, we named them Feelings about the 
Instrumental Outcome (“Instrumental”), Feelings about the Self (“Self”), Feelings about the 
Relationship (“Relationship”), and Feelings about the Negotiation Process (“Process”). The 
Relationship and Process clusters also appeared to be sub-clusters of a larger factor that 
we named Rapport. 
Multi-dimensional scaling.  Multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) provided a 
converging technique to examine the robustness of the underlying categorical factor 
structure.  MDS uses the proximity among objects to generate a graphical 
representation of the configuration of points to reflect the “hidden structure” in the data 
(Kruskal & Wish, 1978).  Such a technique allows researchers to derive a representation 
of a cognitive structure without the participant necessarily being aware or able to report 
the implicit dimensionality, and without prompting by pre-conceived experimenter 
notions, thus making it particularly suitable for exploratory research and theory 
development (Pinkley, 1990; Rusbult & Zembrodt, 1982). 
In order to determine the appropriate number of dimensions in which to 
represent the data, we used the recommended criteria of (a) no significant increase in 
variance explained (R2) upon addition of further dimensions, (b) an “elbow” or bend in 
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the plot of stress values where lower numbers indicate goodness of fit (values .404, .234, 
.151, .124, .103, and .083 for dimensions 1 through 6, respectively), suggesting that the 
four-dimension solution did not appear substantially to reduce the stress beyond that of 
the three-dimension solution, and (c) yielding a parsimonious and conceptually 
interpretable solution (Kruskal & Wish, 1978).  Balancing these three criteria provided 
the three-dimensional solution illustrated in Figure 2, with R2=.74.  Conceptually, the 
MDS solution also revealed the same four groupings that were identified in the cluster 
analysis, with Instrumental, Self, and Rapport factors, of which Process and 
Relationship appeared to be sub-factors of Rapport, which provided converging 
evidence for the domains of subjective value identified by the sorting task.   
Discussion 
The current study examined the conceptual groupings that emerged among the 
wide range of factors reported by earlier participants as important to them in their 
negotiations.  The goal was to develop a comprehensive and inductively derived 
typology of subjective value.   
Based on the empirical results, negotiation theorists appear to group these 
outcomes into four broad factors representing a comprehensive yet parsimonious 
description of subjective value.  One resulting factor was Feelings about the 
Instrumental Outcome, or the belief by a negotiator of having had a strong objective 
settlement, represented for example by elements such as “winning” a negotiation, 
receiving a refund for a defective product, and obtaining a product of high quality.  A 
second resulting factor was positive Feelings about the Self, for example represented by 
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elements such as saving face and doing the “right thing.”  The third and fourth factors 
addressed Negotiation Process and Relationship issues, respectively, under a larger 
concept of Rapport. Process included, for example, elements such as being listened to 
by the other party.   Relationship issues included, for example, elements such as trust, 
and not damaging the parties’ relationship with each other.   
Although these categories emerged inductively from the data generated by 
participants in Studies 1 and 2, deductively they bear strong resemblance to previous 
conceptual frameworks for classifying subjective outcomes in negotiation.  Thompson’s 
(1990) outline of social psychological measures of negotiation performance focused on 
perceptions of the negotiation situation (similar to our Process factor), perceptions of 
the other party (similar to our Relationship factor), and perceptions of the self (similar 
to our Self factor).  Following Oliver, et al. (1994), we further expanded Thompson’s 
framework to emphasize the nexus of economic and perceptual outcomes, in the form 
of subjective beliefs and feelings about the tangible outcome of a bargaining encounter 
(similar to our Instrumental factor).  Thus, our current empirical results support these 
models, using a data-driven approach that converged with results of theory-driven 
approaches. 
 
Study 3: The Subjective Value Inventory 
Studies 1 and 2 identified and classified areas of subjective value relevant and 
important to negotiators, but did not provide a means for researchers to incorporate 
these areas into further work in the field.  The goal of Study 3 is to take the results of the 
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first two studies as a starting point to create a questionnaire, the Subjective Value 
Inventory (SVI).  By generating a relatively large initial pool of questions representing 
the four factors of subjective value identified in Study 2, selecting items for inclusion 
based on their psychometric properties, and confirming that the resulting questionnaire 
accurately portrays the four factor model, our intention is to provide a relatively 
efficient yet broad tool for the inclusion of subjective value as a key outcome in future 
negotiations research. 
Method 
Questionnaire 
The results of Studies 1 and 2 were used to generate a questionnaire intended to 
measure the degree of subjective value experienced in a negotiation.  Inductively, the 
subjective value factors that were generated in Study 1 and subsequently examined in 
Study 2 formed the core basis for generating survey items.  Study 1 generated 20 
different coded categories of subjective value, which distilled into 4 different factors in 
Study 2.  For use in the questionnaire, the first and second authors drafted 14, 8, 19, and 
20 survey items for the categories Feelings about the Instrumental Outcome, Feelings 
about the Self, Feelings about the Relationship, and Feelings about the Negotiation 
Process, respectively, inductively using the subjective value factors and coding derived 
from Study 1 and deductively making use of the research literature on subjective 
outcomes in negotiation in order to guide the amount of coverage for each of the four 
factors.  For example, given the extensive research focus on negotiation process (e.g., 
Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; Greenberg, 1987; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Thibaut & Walker, 
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1975), a greater number of items were included for this factor.  Wording attempted to 
make each item clear, vivid, and applicable to the widest range of possible negotiation 
contexts.  In order to reduce the effects of fatigue, response sets, and question ordering, 
the 66 total questions appeared in one of six different random orders, counterbalanced 
across participants. 
Questionnaire instructions requested participants to consider a recently 
experienced negotiation and to describe it briefly, with one-quarter of a page provided 
for the description, before continuing to respond to the 66 questions with respect to that 
particular negotiation.  As in Study 1, in order to evoke a wide range of possible 
contexts, the survey began with a definition of negotiation as “any situation in which 
people are trying to accomplish a goal and have to communicate with at least one other 
person in order to achieve that goal.”   
Participants 
Given the volume of research on negotiations taking place with student samples, 
for the sake of consistency in creating and testing the properties of a survey instrument 
we elected to work with student samples for this phase of the research program.  
In order to conduct exploratory and confirmatory analyses on separate data sets, 
two distinct samples were recruited (e.g., Moore & Neimeyer, 1991, Church & Burke, 
1994).  The exploratory sample consisted of 141 undergraduate and master’s level 
business students at the University of California, Berkeley, who participated for course 
credit.  The confirmatory sample consisted of 272 master’s level business students at the 
University of California, Los Angeles, who completed the survey as part of a course on 
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negotiations and conflict management.  In order to sample participants drawing on real-
life experiences as well as those responding in real-time without the need to recall 
events from past memory, of these 272 participants, half were assigned at random to 
complete the survey based on an in-class exercise just completed, simulating a salary 
negotiation (Schroth, Ney, Roedter, Rosin, & Tiedmann, 1997), and the other half based 
on a real-life negotiation in which they had taken part outside of the class. 
Results 
An exploratory factor analysis was conducted in order to identify the four best 
items exemplifying each of the four components of subjective value, resulting in a more 
manageably sized 16-item Subjective Value Inventory that could be used in subsequent 
confirmatory analyses.  Because the goal was to examine item loadings as one heuristic 
for selecting survey items, rather than for the purpose of exploring the factor structure 
of the SVI itself, our analytic strategy was to examine each factor of subjective value 
separately in a Principle Component Analysis (PCA) with Varimax rotation containing 
only the items intended for that factor.  The heuristic for item selection was to balance 
three criteria: (a) high loading on its intended factor, (b) content assessing unique 
aspects of the category (McCullough, Emmons & Tsang, 2002), and (c) maximum inter-
item correlations.  Table 2 contains the resulting items selected for each factor.   
Structural Equation Models (SEM) examined the structure and coherence of the 
resulting 16 items, using Analysis of Moment Structure (AMOS) software (Albuckle, 
1997; Byrne, 2001), substituting the sample’s mean value in cases where participants did 
not complete all 16 items.  We compared the fit of three models: (1) one factor 
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containing all 16 items, (2) a three-factor model (Instrumental, Self, and Rapport), and 
(3) the “three-two” model predicted based on the results of Study 2, with three factors 
(Instrumental, Self, and Rapport) and two sub-factors (Relationship and Process) within 
the larger factor of Rapport.  Given the variation and lack of consensus among 
researchers for norms regarding the optimal fit statistics to evaluate SEM models, we 
tested and present a wide range of absolute and relative fit indices (Bentler, 1990; 
Brown & Cudeck, 1993; Church & Burke, 1994; Diamantopoulos & Siguaw, 2000; 
Kelloway, 1998; Mulaik et al., 1989; Steiger, 1990).  These are: (a) absolute indices: chi-
square and chi-square/degree of freedom, Goodness-of-fit index (GFI), root mean 
square error of approximation (RMSEA), root mean square residual (RMR), and 
standardized RMR, and (b) relative fit indices: Bentler and Bonett’s (1980) Normed Fit 
Index (NFI), Bollen’s (1989) Incremental Fit index (IFI), and Bentler’s (1990) 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI).   
Table 3 lists the values of each of these indices for each model.  For the sake of 
providing converging evidence for the factor structure, we include models and fit 
statistics for both the original exploratory participant sample (n=141) used to select the 
survey items as well as the independent confirmatory sample (n=272).  In both cases, 
the single-factor model is a relatively poor fit compared with the 3-factor model, and 
the 3-2 factor model provides a significantly better fit to the data than either of the other 
two.   As support for merging data from the two different types of respondents in the 
confirmatory sample—those completing the survey based on an in-class exercise versus 
those based on a negotiation outside of class—a chi-square test revealed no differences 
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between the factor structures based on responses from each group (χ2 (13) =12.994, ns).  
Figure 3 illustrates this factor structure for the Subjective Value Inventory.  Table 4 lists 
the resulting correlations among the four factors, as well as the reliability of each factor.  
The factor referring to feelings about the Self appears to have the least internal cohesion 
among items—suggesting, perhaps, a more multifaceted nature—and the lowest level 
of association with other scale factors. 
Discussion 
The goal of the current study was to create a general-use questionnaire 
instrument to measure subjective value in negotiations.  We used the psychometric 
properties of individual questions in order to select test items, and confirmed that the 
resulting survey follows the four-factor structure for subjective value that was derived 
in Study 2.   
The 16-item Subjective Value Inventory appears to meet these goals.  There are 
two clearly separate factors of Feelings about the Instrumental Outcome and Feelings 
about the Self.  In addition, as in the second study, the two factors Feelings about the 
Negotiation Process and Feelings about the Relationship appeared to be sub-factors of a 
larger construct of rapport.  This convergence of results between analyses based on 
negotiations experts and student participants provides greater confidence in the 
generalizability of the subjective value classification and the SVI instrument, suggesting 
that both populations appear to use similar implicit categorizations of subjective value.  
For theoretical reasons, we elect to retain the two rapport sub-factors as separate 
constructs rather than to combine them together into a single survey factor.  Although 
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the present research derived these sub-factors deductively, we note—iterating 
inductively—that each corresponds closely to an existing concept in the research 
literature.  Whereas negotiation process is concerned largely with “cold cognition” 
issues such as productive discourse, techniques for reaching appropriate settlements, 
and other related areas, relational concerns draw more emphasis on the “hot” 
interpersonal and affective processes (Thompson, Medvec, Seiden, & Kopelman, 2001; 
Thompson, Nadler, & Kim, 1999). 
  
Study 4: Initial Validation of the SVI 
The fourth study aims to validate the new Subjective Value Inventory as a 
worthwhile tool for researchers interested in measuring the outcomes of negotiations.  
In addition to basic psychometric properties, we focused on establishing the SVI’s 
convergent, divergent, and predictive validity.   
Convergent validity of the SVI would suggest that relevant factors within the 
instrument correlate positively with the tools researchers have used previously to 
examine related areas broadly under the umbrella of subjective value.  For this purpose, 
we included the specific constructs of trust, satisfaction, and justice, examining a mixed-
motive negotiation with multiple issues and integrative potential, in which issues of 
justice, relationship building, and satisfaction had the potential for substantial 
variability across negotiators. 
McAllister (1995) defined trust as “an individual’s belief and willingness to act 
on the basis of the words, actions, and decisions of another” (p. 25). Trust is a critical 
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element of negotiators’ development of an effective working relationship (Lewicki, 
Saunders, & Minton, & Barry, 2002; Lewicki & Stevenson, 1997).  Thus, Hypothesis 1 is 
that trust in a negotiation counterpart converges with rapport as measured by the 
Process and Relationship factors of the SVI.  Likewise, developing effective rapport in a 
working relationship implies greater willingness to work again together in the future, 
which is Hypothesis 2. 
Satisfaction with a negotiation is a critical element of subjective value.  Oliver et 
al.’s (1994) subjective disconfirmation framework uses expectancy and social perception 
theories to argue that negotiator satisfaction is driven by comparison of actual outcomes 
with those expected prior to a negotiation.  They describe the process as a “’better-
than/worse-than’ heuristic” (p. 256) in which negotiators match settlements with their 
prior expectations.  Within their framework, then, are two related values: first, 
satisfaction with an outcome, and second, subjective disconfirmation, the latter being a 
matter of the degree to which the negotiation outcome exceeded prior expectations.  
Because their framework focuses on a negotiator’s satisfaction with the bargaining 
settlement itself, Hypothesis 3 is that both outcome satisfaction and subjective 
disconfirmation converge with the Instrumental factor of the SVI.   
Justice has been the focus of an extensive research literature within negotiations 
and organizational behavior more widely.  Within the larger construct of organizational 
justice, Colquitt (2001) found evidence for four distinct dimensions.  Procedural justice 
refers to fairness in the decision-making processes that lead to decision outcomes, and 
thus Hypothesis 4 is that procedural justice converges with the Process factor of the SVI.  
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Distributive justice refers to fairness in the allocation of outcomes or resources, and thus 
Hypothesis 5 is that distributive justice converges with the Instrumental factor of the 
SVI.  Interpersonal justice refers to fairness in people being treated with respect and 
sensitivity, and thus Hypothesis 6 is that interpersonal justice converges with the 
Relationship factor of the SVI.  The final factor of justice, informational justice, refers to 
justice in being provided with appropriate communication about the procedures of 
decision making, and thus Hypothesis 7 is that informational justice converges with the 
Process factor of the SVI. 
Divergent validity of the SVI would suggest that the tools researchers have used 
previously to capture specific constructs within subjective value would have lesser 
correlations with those factors of subjective value that are less directly relevant based on 
theory.  Thus, Hypothesis 8 is that the largest magnitude of correlations among the four 
factor scores on the SVI and the measures of trust, satisfaction, and justice should be for 
the specific predictions made in Hypotheses 1-7, and that the other correlations, not 
specified in advance by theory, should be of lesser magnitude.  
Further, divergent validity of the SVI would suggest that the instrument should 
be largely uncorrelated with personality traits, which is Hypothesis 9.  Traits are 
conceptualized as stable differences at the individual level (John, Donahue, & Kentle, 
1991; McCrae & John, 1992).  By contrast, the SVI addresses a relational construct 
regarding the outcomes of an interpersonal interaction.  It seems plausible that, over 
time and in dynamic, reciprocal, and self-selected situations, an association could 
develop in which personality traits could guide the types of situations and quality of 
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interpersonal interactions that one experiences chronically in negotiations.  However, 
the current research setting is a one-time negotiation with a randomly assigned partner, 
in which the setting is explicitly delineated and fixed across participants.  Thus, in this 
study, in the absence of supportive theory, strong relationships between personality 
traits and the SVI would be particularly vulnerable to critique that they suggest 
common method bias (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003), in which 
individuals would perhaps report subjective value differently based on stable 
temperamental traits.  In order to sample a range of traits, we test the big five 
personality factors (McCrae & John, 1992) as well as a trait often linked with research on 
personality in negotiation, Machiavellianism (Christie & Geis, 1970). 
Predictive validity of the SVI would imply that responses to the instrument at the 
time of a negotiation would correspond to important, face-valid, criteria at a later point 
in time.  In order to provide such a test, we draw from Thompson’s (1990) argument 
grounding social psychological measures of negotiation in the concepts of social 
perception (Allport, 1955), and thus look for predictive validity in the form of future 
perceptions of counterparts, in a context where those perceptions have real 
consequences for negotiators.  Oliver et al. (1994) argued that the willingness to 
negotiate again with one’s counterpart in the future is a key consequence of subjective 
outcomes.  Drawing from the research literature on job satisfaction (e.g., Schneider, 
1985), they note an extensive body of findings in which satisfaction levels predict 
greater retention and intention to retain current working relationships.  Relying on the 
same logic, Hypothesis 10 is that greater subjective value following a negotiation 
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predicts greater subsequent willingness to engage in cooperative interactions with the 
same negotiation counterpart.  We test this hypothesis in two ways.  First we used a real 
behavioral measure.  As part of participants’ introductory course on negotiations, a 
course in which bargaining outcomes were the sole determinant of students’ grades, we 
specified to participants that there would be a further exercise for which their recorded 
preferences indeed determined the assignment of a future teammate in a team-against-
team negotiation.  Our second test of Hypothesis 10 used semi-behavioral intentions, in 
the form of participants’ opinions of their counterpart’s worthiness for further 
professional contact.  To enhance realism, we used questions designed to sample from 
the type of networking activities common to the alumni of highly rated MBA programs.  
Thus, the current study aimed to document the potential value of subjective value. 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred and four master’s-level business students participated in this study 
as part of a half-semester intensive course on negotiations and conflict management at 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Male n=77, Female n=27). 
Procedure 
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Personality Instruments. At the beginning of the semester, the students completed 
self-report personality questionnaires.  The big five personality inventory (15-item 
measure, Langford, 2003) assessed the five dimensions of: Agreeableness, 
Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Neuroticism, and Openness.  Christie and Geis’ (1970) 
scale assessed Machiavellianism.   
Mixed-Motive Negotiation Exercise. Students negotiated with a randomly paired 
partner in a scorable mixed-motive negotiation exercise called Riggs-Vericomp, in 
which they attempted to reach a deal for the fictional transfer of recycling equipment 
from an engineering firm to a manufacturing firm (Wheeler, 2000).  The exercise 
included a number of distributive issues, in which gain to one partner was at the other’s 
equal expense, compatible issues, in which both parties received the same number of 
points for a given option and thus were best served by the same option (Thompson & 
Hrebec, 1996), and integrative issues, for which participants could logroll in order to 
increase the total points score available to both parties (Froman & Cohen, 1970; Pruitt, 
1983).  
Following the exercise, participants recorded the details of their agreement, 
providing the information from which to compute the number of points earned by each 
party.  In order to make comparable the number of points earned by participants across 
the two different roles, points were converted to standardized Z-scores using a 
comparison group of the other participants sharing the same role.  These Z-scores 
served as the Instrumental Outcome, also known as the Objective Value, for analyses 
below. 
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Post-Negotiation Questionnaires.  Participants also completed a series of post-
negotiation questionnaires.  The Subjective Value Inventory contained the 16-item 
version developed in Study 3.  The instructions for the SVI appear in Appendix 1.  
Colquitt’s (2001) justice scales addressed issues of Procedural Justice, Distributive Justice, 
Interpersonal Justice, and Informational Justice.  Items from Lewicki, Saunders, & Minton, 
& Barry (2002) assessed the Trust between parties (see Lewicki & Stevenson, 1997). 
Additionally, participants recorded their Settlement Satisfaction (7-point scale ranging 
from “Extremely dissatisfied” to “Extremely satisfied”), Willingness to negotiate again 
with same partner (7-point scale ranging from “No, prefer another” to “Yes, prefer this 
partner”), and Subjective Disconfirmation (7-point scale ranging from “Much worse than 
expected” to “Much better than expected”), using single-item measures from Oliver, et 
al. (1994).  
Behavioral Measures.  Just before the end of the course, participants completed two 
measures that served as behavioral and semi-behavioral assessments of their 
negotiation counterparts from the mixed-motive exercise.  First, participants recorded 
their Teammate Preference Rating, which was a rating participants provided for all three 
previous in-class exercise negotiation counterparts in order to provide the instructor 
with their preferences for actual use to determine the student’s teammate in a team-on-
team exercise, the results of which contributed towards their course grade.  Thus, 
participants voted “with their feet” to indicate interest in working with their 
counterpart in a future cooperative venture, to negotiate together against another 
student team.  At the same time, participants were asked to make a series of Behavioral 
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Intention ratings of each of their previous counterparts, recording their opinion of the 
counterpart’s worthiness for further professional contact using questions designed to 
represent networking activities typical among the alumni of top business schools: (a) 
Would you want to have this person as your business partner? (b) If you were 
considering whether or not to join a firm, and you found out that this person works 
there, would that make you more or less likely to join? (c) If a friend asked your advice 
about whether to engage in a business transaction with this person, would you 
recommend doing so? (d) Years from now, if you ran into this person at a professional 
meeting, would you be likely to approach him or her? (e) How likely is it that you will 
seek to remain in contact with this person? (Scale of 1 to 7; alpha = .91). 
Results 
Convergent and Divergent Validity 
Table 5 shows the relationship between the Subjective Value Inventory and the 
mixed-motive negotiation exercise results in terms of objective points scored as well as 
post-negotiation questionnaires.  Addressing the validity of the SVI, the objective 
Instrumental Outcome correlated significantly with the factor Feelings about the 
Instrumental Outcome—suggesting that participants had a sense of their performance, 
albeit an imperfect sense—but did not correlate with the Self, Process, or Relationship 
factors of the SVI.  This indicates that the SVI does not merely tap common method bias 
relating to a global satisfaction factor anchored in perceived negotiation performance. 
Relationships between the 4 factors of the SVI and additional post-negotiation 
questionnaires also suggest strong convergent and acceptable divergent validity.  As 
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predicted by Hypothesis 1, Trust correlated most strongly with the Process and 
Relationship factors of the SVI.  Likewise, addressing Hypothesis 2, willingness to 
negotiate again with the same partner correlated most strongly with the Process and 
Relationship factors, falling under the larger construct of rapport.  In support of 
Hypothesis 3, both Subjective Disconfirmation and Outcome Satisfaction were most 
strongly related with the Instrumental factor.  As predicted by Hypotheses 4, 5, 6, and 7, 
respectively, Procedural Justice was most strongly related with the Process factor, 
Distributive Justice with the Instrumental factor, Interpersonal Justice with the 
Relationship factor, and Informational Justice with the Process factor.  In support of 
Hypothesis 8, the above correlations were all the largest in magnitude for the 
theoretically related factor of the SVI, rather than factors of the SVI not specifically 
predicted to converge.  Taken together, these patterns suggest that the particular factors 
of the SVI, although correlated with each other, appear to have non-overlapping 
variance that addresses distinct constructs previously represented in the research 
literature on negotiations. 
As further evidence for the validity of the SVI, in support of Hypothesis 9, Table 
6 presents correlations between SVI factors and personality traits.  Because these traits 
are individual differences, and the SVI addresses a relational construct regarding the 
outcomes of an interpersonal interaction with a randomly assigned partner, the lack of 
significant correlations in Table 6 is noteworthy and suggests that the SVI does not 
merely tap common method bias relating to a global factor such as agreeableness or 
scale usage tendencies (Podsakoff et al., 2003). 
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Predictive validity 
The behavioral measures indicated the extent to which participants provided 
actual and intended expressions of interest in working again together with their 
counterparts in the future.  Table 7 summarizes the results of ordinary least squares 
linear regression models predicting two different measures of intended relationship 
continuation, on the basis of the participant’s subjective and objective outcomes, as well 
as the corresponding outcomes of their counterparts.  Providing support for Hypothesis 
10, participants reporting higher subjective value gave significantly higher teammate 
preference ratings requesting to work together in the future on a cooperative task.  By 
contrast, the participants’ actual objective outcome of the negotiation had no such 
impact on the teammate preference ratings.  There was a marginal trend in which 
greater subjective value reported by the counterpart reduced the teammate preference 
rating given to them.  For behavioral intention ratings, similarly, participants reporting 
greater subjective value expressed greater intentions to maintain a positive professional 
connection with their counterpart.  By contrast with subjective value, achieving greater 
objective value actually predicted marginally lower intentions for further professional 
contact.  Thus, for both measures, subjective value was a better predictor than objective 
value of participants’ preferences for future interaction with their negotiation partners. 
Discussion 
The current study provides preliminary data demonstrating that the new 
Subjective Value Inventory is a worthwhile and valid tool to assess the subjective 
element of negotiations.  The SVI’s four factors—feelings about the Instrumental 
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Outcome, the Self, Negotiation Process, and Relationship—appear to converge as 
predicted with theoretically relevant constructs examined in prior negotiations research 
(e.g., Colquitt, 2001; Lewicki & Stevenson, 1997; Oliver et al., 1994).  The inherently 
relational and situational SVI also diverges from stable individual difference measures 
such as Machiavellianism (Christie & Geis, 1970) and the big five personality traits 
(Langford, 2003; McCrae & John, 1992). 
Particularly noteworthy were the predictive validity findings demonstrating that 
greater subjective value following a negotiation predicts greater subsequent willingness 
to engage in cooperative interactions with the same negotiation counterpart.  
Participants responding with higher values to the SVI were more likely to choose their 
counterpart as a partner with whom to work together against another team when part 
of their own grade was at stake.  In fact, subjective value was a better predictor of 
inclination towards such future interaction than instrumental value.  This finding 
speaks to the great value of subjective value, an element often overlooked in 
negotiations research that focuses strictly on bargaining agreements.  The finding also 
speaks to the enduring nature of subjective value over time—apparently, more 
enduring than objective outcomes.  Participants completed the SVI shortly after the 
negotiation yet recorded their teammate preferences weeks later.  Finally, this finding 
speaks to the validity of the SVI as a survey instrument—both in terms of participants’ 
ability to introspect about subjective value as well as their willingness to report these 
feelings—in that the SVI strongly predicted a later rating that had real consequences for 
the participants.   
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Two unexpected trends emerged with marginal significance.  First, there was a 
suggestive effect whereby participants recorded lesser preference to be teammates with 
those counterparts who themselves had reported greater subjective value.  Thompson, 
Valley, and Kramer’s (1995) inverse affect model argues that negotiators tend to use the 
emotional states of counterparts as signals, and that the common perception of 
negotiation as a fixed pie leads them to experience affect in opposition to that of their 
counterpart, through a social comparison process (e.g., Loewenstein, Thompson, & 
Bazerman, 1989; McClelland & Rohrbaugh, 1978; Straub & Murnighan, 1995).  For 
example, one might interpret a happy counterpart as cause for disappointment and a 
disappointed counterpart as cause for cheer.  We speculate that such a mechanism 
could explain this marginal trend—put simply, experiencing high subjective value may 
have leaked through to a counterpart as gloating.  A second trend was that participants 
who achieved greater objective rewards in the negotiation reported lesser intentions to 
maintain professional interaction with their counterpart.  We speculate that those 
individuals who were able to extract great amounts of value away from their 
counterpart may have devalued that person as a future business contact. 
 
General Discussion 
The current studies contribute towards a comprehensive framework of social 
psychological outcomes in negotiation.  Using a combination of inductive and 
deductive methods, and involving participants ranging from students to community 
members and negotiation practitioners, we attempted to answer the question: What do 
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people value when they negotiate?  Whereas the study of subjective value is not itself 
new to the field of negotiation, this is the first attempt to connect together this range 
and breadth of concepts, to probe inductively for possible blind spots, and to provide 
future researchers with a valid and efficient tool to standardize the measure of non-
instrumental consequences of negotiation.  The four-factor model of subjective value 
that emerged included (a) feelings about instrumental outcomes—e.g., outcome 
satisfaction and distributional fairness, (b) feelings about the self—e.g., saving face and 
living up to one’s own standards, (c) feelings about the negotiation process—e.g., 
fairness and voice, and (d) feelings about the relationship—e.g., trust and a good 
foundation for the future.  The relationship and process clusters also appeared to be 
sub-clusters of a larger factor of rapport.  This model also served as an empirical 
validation of previous conceptual frameworks used to describe social-psychological 
measures in negotiation (Thompson, 1990; Oliver et al. 1994). 
Empirical findings suggested, intriguingly, the understated value of subjective 
value.  First, subjective value was less salient but no less important to negotiators than 
were objective metrics of their performance.  Participants in Study 1 reported a diverse 
range of goals for their negotiations. Although they mentioned the tangible terms of 
agreements more frequently than other factors, in these open-ended responses fully half 
of all participants did not mention tangible outcomes at all.  Even those participants 
listing objective terms rated them as no more important than other—more subjective—
factors.  These findings suggest that researchers may dramatically underrate subjective 
outcomes in negotiation given their real-world importance.  Second, in Study 4 
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subjective value was a better predictor of negotiators’ future behaviors and intentions 
than was objective performance.  Participants reporting high subjective value were 
more likely weeks later to choose their counterpart for a future cooperative interaction 
that had real stakes, and were also more likely to report plans to maintain a professional 
relationship.  This finding also speaks to the validity of the Subjective Value Inventory 
instrument, given that participants were able and willing to self-report responses that 
later correlated strongly with choices that had real consequences.  A third particularly 
noteworthy finding concerns the significant—yet low—correlation between feelings 
about instrumental outcomes and those outcomes themselves.  This suggests the 
difficulty, even in the controlled setting of an in-class negotiation exercise, of gathering 
and processing accurate information about one’s objective performance.  Thus, 
subjective value is much of the gain we realize from a negotiation.  
Limitations 
 The biggest limitation of this research program is, simply put, whether people 
value what they say that they value in their negotiations.  We relied on self-report in the 
open-ended generation of subjective value factors in Study 1, their mapping in Study 2, 
and the use of Likert scales in Studies 3 and 4.   We address this concern in two ways, 
first conceptually and second empirically.  Conceptually, we argue that what people say 
they value in a negotiation itself is important.  The accuracy of such accounts could not 
truly be evaluated without losing meaning (e.g., Ross, 2001; Ross & Nisbett, 1991).  To 
obtain an immediate and direct method to ascertain a participant’s accuracy in 
reporting subjective value would represent a paradox—that of providing an objective 
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criterion against which to compare inherently subjective value.  Indeed, the question of 
how to measure and track subjective experience is a current focus of a growing volume 
of research on well-being and hedonic science (Diener, 1984; Kahneman, Diener, & 
Schwarz, 1999; Schwarz & Strack, 1999), grappling with similar issues of self-report, 
such as self-presentation and social desirability. 
 That said, the burden falls upon us to demonstrate that participants are willing 
and able to report their subjective value, and we do so empirically with the results of 
Study 4.  To maintain that participant responses are driven by more than declarative 
knowledge and folk beliefs that may be internally valid but not valid with respect to 
actual future behaviors, we present initial data demonstrating the SVI is a strong 
predictor of future behaviors with consequences for participants.  Their choice of a 
teammate for a team-against-team negotiation had genuine stakes in a class for which 
objective point scores in in-class exercises were the sole determinants of students’ 
grades.  Thus, the strongly positive findings demonstrate participants were capable and 
willing to report accurately about their subjective value.  Self-reports, whatever 
underlying attribution process represented, have an inherent validity or interest to 
researchers when they predict important consequences for individuals. 
 A second limitation of the current research program was the use of student 
samples in Studies 3 and 4, which examined the factor structure of the SVI instrument 
and provided initial data on its reliability and validity.  Although such samples are 
representative of the body of negotiations research conducted with student participants, 
given the evidence in Study 1 that students may differ in the focus and importance they 
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place on various factors of subjective value, more research would be worthwhile to 
include practitioners and community members before assuming that the SVI instrument 
generalizes unchanged for use with wider populations. 
Future Research 
 The results of these studies suggest a number of avenues for further research.  
First, the systematic approach taken by the current investigation points to the relatively 
less investigated areas within subjective value.  Notably, feelings about the self emerged 
as a strong independent factor, and its relatively lower inter-item consistency suggests 
it to be complex and multidimensional. Yet, of the four components of subjective value, 
the Self encompasses the smallest existing research literature within negotiations.  
Newer work on the role of face threat and stereotype threat and confirmation (e.g., 
Kray, Thompson, & Galinsky, 2001; Walters, Stuhlmacher, Meyer, 1998; White et al., 
2004) attempts to remedy this gap, and more research in this and related areas would be 
worthwhile.  
Likewise, the field would benefit from greater understanding of feelings about 
instrumental outcomes.  It is a critical question how you know whether you succeeded 
in a negotiation.  The current empirical findings suggest that such knowledge is 
imperfect, revealing only a modestly sized correlation of r = .25 with the objective 
outcomes themselves.  Yet such knowledge is crucial for learning: experience can be a 
lousy teacher if one’s conclusions about that experience are flawed.  Research on 
counterfactual thinking finds that individuals engage in counterfactuals as a result of 
negative affect and misfortune, and that their resulting elaboration of causal inference 
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mechanisms is adaptive (e.g., Galinsky, Seiden, Kim, & Medvec, 2002; Lipe, 1991; Roese, 
1997).  But what if negotiators aren’t able to diagnose accurately their own misfortunes?  
If subjective feelings about success and failure trigger counterfactual reasoning, then a 
greater understanding of subjective value is a critical component underlying theories of 
feedback and negotiator learning and training. 
More research exploring the consequences of subjective value would be 
worthwhile.  Earlier, we speculated that one value of subjective value is that it may feed 
back positively into future economic outcomes.  Such a speculation awaits more 
complete testing than the preliminary results presented in Study 4.  A basic question is 
whether the suggestive finding, that subjective value was a stronger predictor than 
objective value of important future consequences, would replicate in contexts with 
greater personal stakes for negotiators.  A more detailed question concerns the 
boundary conditions of such an effect: under what circumstances should subjective 
value be a good predictor of future instrumental outcomes? 
 Further, more research should explore the precursors of subjective value.  What 
leads to greater feelings of personal reward from a negotiation?  Among the factors to 
be explored could include cognitions—such as norms, expectations, aspirations, and 
preferences—structural issues—such as the relationship among the parties, including 
the likelihood of future interaction, the subject and setting of the negotiation, the issues 
to be decided, and the medium of communication—and individual differences—such as 
personality factors, culture, and other demographic background characteristics.  Even 
for researchers who do not focus on subjective value per se, including it as an outcome 
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measure provides the potential to observe the consequences of particular experimental 
manipulations on subjective experience.  In examining how subjective value arises in a 
negotiation, it is also important to take a process orientation and to examine the 
behaviors that take place, for example the strategies and tactics used, whether parties 
are cooperative versus competitive, how they share information, and other factors. 
Practical implications and interventions 
Given the widespread importance of effective negotiating, how can we put to use 
an understanding of subjective value?  Study 1 suggests that the objective terms of an 
agreement may be more salient, but perhaps no more important than other factors.  This 
raises the question of what might happen by focusing negotiators’ attention on 
subjective value.  However, we argue that more work would be necessary to validate 
any intervention approach.  For example, evidence suggests that merely focusing on 
one’s subjective value can have a counterproductive impact on it.  Conlon and Hunt 
(2002) found that representing outcomes to participants in terms of smiling and 
frowning faces—rather than numerical payoff grids—resulted in greater emotional 
involvement, but that this involvement in turn resulted in longer negotiation times and 
higher impasse rates.  Conlon and Hunt argued that the high rates of disagreement in 
real-world negotiations are consistent with greater emotional involvement outside of 
controlled research settings.  This observation is consistent with our finding in Study 1 
that real-world negotiators appear to place great importance on subjective factors.  We 
speculate that interpersonal skills such as emotional intelligence (EI; e.g., Mayer, 
Salovey, & Caruso, 2000; Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, & Sitarenios, 2001) may serve to 
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moderate such findings—in which the conventional wisdom that emotional 
involvement is detrimental for reaching agreements (e.g., Bazerman & Neale, 1992) 
holds in the case of low EI, but that focusing on subjective value and increasing 
emotional involvement could benefit negotiators with high EI.  We hope that the 
promising findings of the current paper serve as a call for research that can develop and 
support nuanced recommendations about the methods and contexts in which 
negotiators should focus on their subjective value in order to improve the outcomes and 
experience of their interactions.  
Conclusion 
The purpose of this article has been to present a comprehensive framework of the 
range of inherently social psychological outcomes in negotiation, which serves as a 
compliment to more tangible, instrumental, or economic outcomes. It is our hope that 
such a framework serves to encourage, systematize, and facilitate research that looks 
beyond economic exchange as the consequence of interpersonal negotiations.  The field 
of negotiations has been a uniquely interdisciplinary pursuit, eagerly incorporating 
perspectives from economics, law, organizational behavior and industrial relations, 
sociology, as well as psychology.  The current research aimed to put a social 
psychological stamp on the study of negotiation outcomes. 
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Table 1 
Frequencies, Ratings, and Coding Reliability of Subjective Value Factors Reported in Business 
and Personal Negotiations 
 
                    
 Business  Personal   
 Frequency Importance  Frequency Importance  Coding 
Coding Category 
 
% M SD   % M SD   Reliability 
Non-quantifiable terms 
of the agreement 15.8% 5.4 1.4  13.3% 5.3 1.6  .94 
Quantifiable terms  
of the agreement   9.2% 5.4 1.3  8.3% 5.4 1.6  .89 
Legitimacy  4.2% 5.5 1.7  5.0% 4.5 1.7  .94 
Impact on an outside 
party  3.8% 5.3 1.4  1.9% 6.1 1.2  .80 
Respect  3.1% 5.2 2.0  3.3% 5.6 1.4  .83 
Fairness /equity  1.8% 5.9 1.6  0.7% 6.1 1.2  .98 
Good attitude  1.5% 5.2 1.5  0.7% 5.0 1.8  .92 
Positive emotion  1.3% 6.2 1.2  2.5% 5.6 1.4  .94 
Effective process 1.2% 4.8 1.4  1.5% 5.2 1.9  .85 
Morality/ethics/religious 1.1% 6.7 0.7  0.3% 5.7 2.4  .98 
Resolution  1.0% 6.2 0.8  0.7% 3.6 1.6  .95 
Relationship quality 0.9% 5.8 1.7  1.4% 5.3 1.7  .91 
Trust  0.9% 6.3 0.4  1.0% 5.3 1.2  .94 
Listening  0.6% 5.7 1.6  0.9% 6.0 1.0  .96 
Satisfaction  0.5% 5.4 1.1  2.0% 5.8 1.3  .84 
Acknowledgement of 
wrongdoing /remedy  0.5% 6.6 0.5  0.1% 7.0 -  .98 
Saving face 0.4% 3.3 2.2  0.2% 3.5 3.5  1.00 
Compromise/mutual 
agreement  0.3% 5.3 1.5  1.9% 6.1 0.9  .82 
Winning  0.2% 5.5 2.1  0.3% 4.7 1.5  .88 
Peaceful/non-
confrontational  N/L - -  0.4% 2.0 7.4  .67 
Unclear or other  2.6% 0.5 2.0   2.6% 0.8 2.1   .89 
Overall 50.8%       49.2%       .87 
 
Note: N/L indicates that no participant in that condition listed a subjective value factor 
falling under the particular coding category. 
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Table 2 
 
16-item Subjective Value Inventory 
 
Question  Wording 
Factor 
Loading
 
A. Feelings about the Instrumental Outcome 
 
1 
 
 
 
How satisfied are you with your own outcome—i.e., 
the extent to which the terms of your agreement (or 
lack of agreement) benefit you? (1=”Not at all 
satisfied”, 4=”Moderately satisfied”, and 7=”Perfectly 
satisfied”; Includes an option “NA”) 
.879
 
2 
 
 
 
How satisfied are you with the balance between your 
own outcome and your counterpart(s)’s outcome(s)? 
(1=”Not at all satisfied”, 4=”Moderately satisfied”, and 
7=”Perfectly satisfied”; Includes an option “NA”) 
.878
 
3 
 
 
Did you feel like you forfeited or “lost” in this 
negotiation?  (1=”Not at all”, 4=”A moderate amount”, 
and 7=”A great deal”; Includes an option “NA”) 
[Reverse]  
.783
 
4 
 
 
 
 
Do you think the terms of your agreement are 
consistent with principles of legitimacy or objective 
criteria (e.g., common standards of fairness, precedent, 
industry practice, legality, etc.)? (1=”Not at all”, 
4=”Moderately”, and 7=”A great deal”; Includes an 
option “NA”) 
.674
    
B. Feelings about the Self  
 
5 
 
 
Did you “lose face” (i.e., damage your sense of pride) 
in the negotiation? (1=”Not at all”, 4=”Moderately”, 
and 7=”A great deal”; Includes an option “NA”) 
[Reverse] 
.657
 
6 
 
 
Did you behave according to your own principles and 
values? (1=”Not at all”, 4=”Moderately”, and 7=”A 
great deal”; Includes an option “NA”) 
.635
 
7 
 
 
 
Did this negotiation make you feel more or less 
competent as a negotiator? (1=”It made me feel less 
competent”, 4=”It did not make me feel more or less 
competent”, and 7=”It made me feel more competent”; 
Includes an option “NA”) 
.625
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8 
 
 
Did you feel as though you behaved appropriately in 
this negotiation? (1=”Not at all”, 4=”Moderately”, and 
7=”A great deal”; Includes an option “NA”) 
.608
    
C. Feelings about the Process  
 
9 
 
 
Did your counterpart(s) consider your wishes, 
opinions, or needs? (1=”Not at all”, 4=”Moderately”, 
and 7=”Very much”; Includes an option “NA”) 
.844
 
10 
 
 
Do you feel your counterpart(s) listened to your 
concerns? (1=”Not at all”, 4=”Moderately”, and 7=”A 
great deal”; Includes an option “NA”) 
.834
 
11 
 
 
Would you characterize the negotiation process as fair? 
(1=”Not at all”, 4=”Moderately”, and 7=”A great deal”; 
Includes an option “NA”) 
.736
 
12 
 
 
How satisfied are you with the ease (or difficulty) of 
reaching an agreement? (1=”Not at all satisfied”, 
4=”Moderately satisfied”, and 7=”Perfectly satisfied”; 
Includes an option “NA”) 
.708
    
D.  Feelings about the Relationship  
 
13 
 
 
What kind of “overall” impression did your 
counterpart(s) make on you? (1=”Extremely negative”, 
4=”Neither negative nor positive”, and 7=”Extremely 
positive”; Includes an option “NA”) 
.851
 
14 
 
Did the negotiation make you trust your 
counterpart(s)? (1=”Not at all”, 4=Moderately”, and 
7=”A great deal”; Includes an option “NA”) 
.791
 
15 
 
 
 
How satisfied are you with your relationship with your 
counterpart(s) as a result of this negotiation? (1=”Not 
at all satisfied”, 4=”Moderately satisfied”, and 
7=”Perfectly satisfied”; Includes an option “NA”) 
.789
 
16 
 
 
Did the negotiation build a good foundation for a 
future relationship with your counterpart(s)? (1=”Not 
at all”, 4=”Moderately”, and 7=”A great deal”; 
Includes an option “NA”) 
.786
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Table 3 
 
Structural Equation Models of the Subjective Value Inventory 
 
 
  Absolute fit Comparative fit 
Model 
comparison 
 χ2 df χ2/df GFI RMSEA RMR SRMR CFI NFI IFI χ2difference 
          
Exploratory Sample, n=141          
1-factor  355.147 104 3.415 .723 .131 .24 .0915 .786 .826 .789 - 
3-factor 216.017 101 2.139 .837 .09 .199 .0756 .902 .833 .904 139.13*** 
3-2 factor 176.887 98 1.805 .861 .076 .174 .0639 .933 .863 .934 39.13*** 
            
Confirmatory Sample, n=272          
1-factor  403.238 104 3.877 .831 .103 .128 .0699 .860 .821 .861 - 
3-factor 300.753 101 2.978 .879 .085 .139 .0722 .906 .866 .907 102.485*** 
3-2 factor  269.574 98 2.751 .89 .08 .102 .0535 .920 .880 .920 31.179*** 
            
            
 
Notes: The 1-factor model contains all 16 items, the 3-factor model contains items 
grouped into the factors Perceived Instrumental Outcome, Self, and Rapport, and the 
predicted 3-2 factor model groups items into three factors (Perceived Instrumental 
Outcome, Self, and Rapport) with two sub-factors (Relationship and Process) contained 
within larger factor of Rapport.   
CFI - Comparative Fit Index, GFI - Goodness-of-fit index, NFI - Normed Fit Index, 
IFI - Incremental Fit index, RMSEA – Root Mean Square Error of Approximation, RMR 
– Root Mean Square Residual, SRMR – Standardized RMR. 
* p<.05,  ** p<.01, *** p<.001; all values two-tailed. 
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Table 4 
 
Reliability and Correlations among the four Factors of the Subjective Value Inventory 
 
 Factor 1. 2. 3. 4.
        
1.  Instrumental (.86)       
2. Self .54 *** (.63)    
3. Process .70 *** .49 *** (.85)  
4. Relationship .72 *** .49 *** .83 *** (.88)
 
Notes: Reliabilities appear in parentheses on the diagonals. 
~p < .10; *p < .05; **p<.01; ***p<.001; all values two-tailed. 
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Table 5 
 
Correlations between the Subjective Value Inventory and Point Scores and Post-Negotiation 
Scales Completed for a Mixed-Motive Negotiation Exercise 
 
 
  Feelings about the 
 
Total 
SVI 
 
Instrumental 
Outcome Self Process 
Relation- 
ship 
      
Instrumental 
Outcome .12 .25** -.06 .16 .05 
      
Trust .45*** .38*** .16 .64*** .57*** 
Willingness to 
negotiate again .63*** .55*** .31*** .68*** .71*** 
Subjective 
Disconfirmation .73*** .76*** .46*** .70*** .56*** 
Outcome satisfaction .81*** .83*** .53*** .71*** .61*** 
      
Justice .72*** .63*** .44*** .75*** .72*** 
   Procedural justice .66*** .56*** .48*** .67*** .61*** 
   Distributive justice .58*** .62*** .34*** .57*** .45*** 
   Interpersonal justice .54*** .41*** .34*** .55*** .63*** 
   Informational justice .56*** .45*** .26*** .65*** .66*** 
      
 
Notes: Items in boldface indicate predicted convergent scales. 
~p<.10, *p<.05,  **p<.01, ***p<.001, all values two-tailed. 
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Table 6 
 
Correlations Illustrating Divergent Validity between Personality Traits and the Subjective 
Value Inventory Completed for a Mixed-Motive Negotiation Exercise 
 
 
  Feelings about the 
  
Total 
SVI 
 
Instrumental 
Outcome Self Process 
Relation- 
ship 
Machiavellianism  ‐.11  ‐.08  ‐.15  ‐.02  ‐.07 
Openness  .14  .05  .12  .13  .20~ 
Conscientiousness  .06  .08  .11  ‐.05  ‐.06 
Extraversion  ‐.04  .05  ‐.17~  ‐.08  ‐.03 
Agreeableness  .03  ‐.02  .04  .02  .04 
Neuroticism  .11  .07  .20~  .00  .03 
 
~p<.10, *p<.05,  **p<.01, ***p<.001, all values two-tailed. 
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Table 7 
 
Prediction of Behavioral Measures from the Subjective and Objective Outcomes of a Mixed-
Motive Exercise 
 
 
  Model 1:   Model 2:  
  
Teammate
Preference
Ranking   
Behavioral
Intention
Ratings  
             
       
Participant’s Outcomes      
 Subjective Value .42 ***  .55 *** 
 Objective Value .05   -.18 ~ 
     
Counterpart’s Outcomes      
 Subjective Value -.19 ~  -.02  
 Objective Value .11   .05  
       
       
Model diagnostics      
N 94   93  
F-test of model F(4, 89)   F(4, 88)  
 Value of F 4.07 ***  9.50 *** 
R-squared .15   .30  
Adjusted R-squared .12   .27  
       
 
Notes: All terms other than model diagnostics are standardized regression coefficients 
(beta).   
~p < .10; *p < .05; **p<.01; all values two-tailed. 
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Figure 1 
Cluster Analysis Tree Diagram Illustrating the Conceptual Distance among Subjective Value 
Factors 
 
   Case   0         5        10       
Label        +---------+---------+----  
   
PARTY “WINS” THE NEGOTIATION   òûòòòòòòòø  
PARTY GETS ITS WAY   ò÷       ùòòòø  
PARTY ADMITS TO ITS WRONGDOING   òûòòòòòòò÷   ó Instru- 
PARTY ACKNOWLEDGES ITS NEGLIGENCE   ò÷           ó mental 
PARTY SPENDS NO MORE THAN $X FOR PRODUCT   òø           ó  
PARTY GIVES REFUND AS THE PRODUCT IS DEFECTIVE   òú           ó              
PARTY PAYS A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT   òôòø         ó              
PARTY RECEIVES BONUS BECAUSE OF HARD WORK   ò÷ ùòø       ó              
PARTY GETS 30 DAYS VACATION   òòò÷ ùòòòòòòò÷              
PARTY PERCEIVED PRODUCT OF HIGH QUALITY   òòòòò÷                      
PARTY SAVES FACE   òòòø                        
PARTY MAINTAINS SELF ESTEEM   òòòôòòòø                    
PARTY DOES NOT FEEL DECEIVED   òòò÷   ùòòòø                
PARTY THINKS THE OUTCOME IS FAIR   òûòòòø ó   ó                
PARTY FEELS LIKE IT IS TREATED FAIRLY   ò÷   ùò÷   ó               Self 
PARTY DOES THE “RIGHT THING”   òòòûò÷     ó                
PARTY PERCEIVES GOD BE PLEASED BY ITS BEHAVIOR   òòò÷       ó                
PARTY ENJOYS WHAT IT RECEIVES   òø         ó                
PARTY FEELS HAPPY   òôòòòòòòòø ó                
PARTY LIKES OUTCOME   ò÷       ùò÷                
THIRD PARTIES ARE TREATED WELL   òòòûòòòòò÷                  
NON-INVOLVED PARTIES ARE SATISFIED   òòò÷                       
PARTIES MAINTAIN THEIR CALM   òø                          
DISCUSSION IS NON-CONFRONTATIONAL   òôòòòø                      
TALK DURING THE NEGOTIAON KEPT CONSTRUCTIVE   ò÷   ó                      
PARTIES INTERACT IN A RATIONAL, PROFESSIONAL MANNER   òûòø ùòòòòòòòø             (Process)
PARTY FEELS COUNTERPART IS LISTENING   ò÷ ùòú       ó              
PARTIES BRAINSTORM OPTIONS TOGETHER   òûò÷ ó       ó              
PARTY LISTENS TO WHAT COUNTERPART HAS TO SAY   ò÷   ó       ó              
PARTY IS WILLING TO BE FLEXIBLE   òûòø ó       ó             Rapport 
PARTY’S OPINIONS ARE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION   ò÷ ùò÷       ó  
PARTY NOT SHOW A NEGATIVE ATTITUDE   òòò÷         ó  
PARTY NOT HURT COUNTERPART’S FEELINGS   òòòø         ó  
PARTY IS TRUSTED   òòòôòòòø     ó  
PARTY RECOGNIZES COUNTERPART’S NEEDS   òòò÷   ó     ó (Rela- 
PARTIES MUTUALLY AGREE   òòòø   ùòòòòò÷ tion- 
PARTIES PUT THE ISSUE BEHIND THEM   òòòôòø ó ship) 
NEGOTIATION NOT LEAD TO FUTURE CONFLICT   òòòú ùò÷  
PARTY’S RELATIONSHIP IS NOT AFFECTED   òòò÷ ó  
PARTIES REACH AGREEMENT QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE   òòòòò÷  
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Figure 2 
 
Multi-dimensional Scaling Analysis Illustrating the Conceptual Distance among Subjective 
Value Factors 
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Figure 3 
 
Factor Structure of the Subjective Value Inventory 
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Appendix 1 
 
Instructions for The Subjective Value Inventory 16‐item Questionnaire 
 
General Instructions:  For each question, please circle a number from 1‐7 that most 
accurately reflects your opinion.  You will notice that some of the questions are similar 
to one another; this is primarily to ensure the validity and reliability of the 
questionnaire.  Please simply answer each question independently, without reference to 
any of the other questions.  
 
Important:  If you encounter a particular question that is not applicable to your 
negotiation, simply circle “NA.”  Even if you did not reach agreement, please try to 
answer as many questions as possible. 
 
